

## **Providence and the Souls: A Platonic Chapter in Clement of Alexandria**

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Willy Theiler has in his recent volume *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus*<sup>1</sup> besides papers of earlier origin published a new study entitled: "Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes". The opinions which he advances in his study and, as everybody would expect, supports with great acumen and learning, must have come as a surprise to the world of classical scholars. For on a previous occasion<sup>2</sup> Theiler had spoken of Ammonius Saccas as a "grosser Schatten" and this felicitous phrase had become associated with Ammonius' name not only in the minds of fellow workers on Plotinus or the Neoplatonic schools in general but of many others who like myself readily entrust themselves to Theiler's guidance in this forbidding territory. In the new study the "shadow" has acquired flesh and blood; Ammonius has turned into a philosophical personality of clearly defined identity. Far more energetically than anybody before him<sup>3</sup> Theiler has for the reconstruction of Ammonius' system used Photius' reports (codd. 214 and 251) about a treatise of Hierocles, the 5th century Platonist. The Ammonius whose tenets on *πρόνοια* Hierocles set forth must in Theiler's opinion have been Ammonius Saccas; from a historical point of view it makes sense to attribute the doctrines of the treatise to the man who taught Plotinus and the Christian Origen<sup>4</sup>.

The Christian Platonism of the great Origen, as embodied in his *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, helps Theiler in his reconstruction of Ammonius Saccas' system. Conversely, as soon as Ammonius is sufficiently known, he should aid us in seeing Origen's philosophy in the correct historical perspective. For the comparison of Ammonius' and Origen's philosophical outlook Theiler's research lays the groundwork. To appreciate the originality of the Christian thinker we shall do well to focus with Theiler on the contrast between the essentially static hierarchy of beings in Am-

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<sup>1</sup> (Berlin 1966) 1-45.

<sup>2</sup> Scil. in the paper *Plotin und die antike Philosophie* (republished in the same collection; see *ibid.* 148 and also VIII). On the previous status of scholarship with regard to Ammonius Saccas see E. R. Dodds, *Entretiens sur l'antiquité class.* 5 (Vandœuvres-Genève 1957) 24ff.; for Dodds' own opinion see *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> For earlier attempts in the same direction see Theiler himself 2f. and cf. esp. F. Heinemann, *Hermes* 61 (1926) 1ff.; R. Cadiou, *La jeunesse d'Origène* (Paris 1935) 184ff.; H. Langerbeck, *JHS* (1957) 67ff.

<sup>4</sup> He seems also to be the teacher of the pagan Neoplatonist (or pre-Neoplatonist) Origenes now better known through K. O. Weber's monograph, *Origenes der Neuplatoniker* (Zetemata 27, 1962). Unlike most other scholars, Heinrich Dörrie, *Hermes* 83 (1955) 439ff. believes there were two Ammonii, a pagan who taught the pagan, and a Christian who taught the Christian Origen.

monius and the movements from one ring (or rung, not to say rank) to another which are a central conception of Origen's hierarchy. In Origen "προκοπή und ἀρετή – oder das Umgekehrte – reissen die Schotten auf" (p. 30), i.e. the rigid separation of entities higher and lower on the scale is given up. Depending upon its conduct in one life, the soul may find its next home in a being of superior or inferior status; from a man it may pass to an angel or to a demon<sup>5</sup>. However, like Ammonius—at least the Ammonius who is Hierocles' authority—Origen too holds that out of the diversity of living entities and their intentions God creates a consensus, which is the harmony and perfection, in fact also the plenitude of one cosmos<sup>6</sup>. In the end this consensus will again become a One; all beings will return to God (who also is their origin). In the great cosmological drama of Christian history this return to a new *ἔνωσις* is identical with universal salvation—one of Origen's most daringly heretical doctrines.

Decidedly the mobility in Origen's hierarchical scheme, the pattern of rise and fall from one level to another, sets his system apart not only from that of Ammonius but from many other hierarchies familiar to us from A. O. Lovejoy's *Great Chain of Being*<sup>7</sup>. Still, regarding the antecedents of Origen's speculative philosophy—and it is only with this, not with his theology, his mysticism, or his exegetical work that we are dealing—a rather curious situation has developed during the last half century of scholarly research. While much attention has been given to Middle- as well as to Neoplatonic influences, from whatever specific source they may come; while Philo's name is invoked with due frequency; while the apologists are (within proper limits) appreciated as Origen's precursors; and while gnostic movements loom in the background, provoking some kind of reaction<sup>8</sup>, even if it be hostile, one source of inspiration has been totally neglected, although it ought to have first claim on our consideration. This is the Alexandrian tradition

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. *De princ.* I 6, 2f. (including the material in Kötschau's adnotatio) and for more evidence below pp. 246f. Cf. Theiler, op. cit. 26 ff. 31 ff.

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. *De princ.* II 1, 2; 107, 21 ff. Kötschau: *Deus ... creaturas ... in tanta animarum varietate ... in unum quendam revocat operis studique consensum ut ... unius tamen mundi plenitudinem perfectionemque consumerent.* For the continuation of this passage and for others see below p. 245f. Cf. the *χορός* and the *συμφωνία* in Hierocles apud Photium *Bibl.* 172 a 37 ff. I am aware that Theiler's thesis has met with some opposition. While not regarding it as "established", I yet consider it very attractive, and have found it illuminating to look at Origen's *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* from this angle.

<sup>7</sup> (Cambridge, Mass. 1936). In ch. VIII Lovejoy traces what he calls the "temporalizing of the chain of nature", implying "creative advances", to the 18th century. For the ancient period, especially the developments between Aristotle and Plotinus one might wish to see Lovejoy's account supplemented by a fuller investigation. Another desideratum would be a comprehensive treatment of the adoption and development in early Christian thought of Greek doctrines concerning the nature and destiny of soul.

<sup>8</sup> See among others Hal Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis. Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus* (Berlin/Leipzig 1932) 229. 236 ff. 244 ff. 263 ff. (specific agreements with Plutarch and the school of Gaius). 315 ff.; J. H. Waszink, *Entretiens* (cf. above n. 2) 3 (1955) 156 f.; Vig. Christ. 19 (1965) 159 f.; J. Daniélou, *Origène* (Paris 1948) 85 ff. 90 f. Cf. also R. Arnou's article *Platonisme des pères* in *Dict. Théol. Cath.* XII 2274 as well as XXII 87.

of Christian Platonism. Clement, who headed the school of Alexandria before Origen taught in it<sup>9</sup>, presents in Book VII of his *Stromateis* thoughts that approximate the basic conceptions of *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, including the idea that the conduct of a soul in one incorporation determines the next place allotted to it within God's just and all-embracing order.

The pertinent section in *Stromateis* VII extends from 6,1 to 15,4<sup>10</sup>. To analyse this section will be our principal task. But the analysis would be of very limited interest if it were conducted without reference to the ultimate source of the entire scheme of thought in Plato's own writings. In which of these are we to look for the source? When turning to this question, we find ourselves faced with a status of research strangely resembling that on Origen's immediate antecedents. Again consideration has been given to various possibilities, yet the truly relevant passages seem to have eluded the investigators. The tendency has been to look for the source of these peculiar doctrines—soon branded as heretical—to the well known myths in Plato's dialogues that deal with the fate of soul after death. An outstanding book on Origen's intellectual development, R. Cadiou's *La jeunesse d'Origène*<sup>11</sup>, considers it significant that he lived at a time when thinkers turned more readily to the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* than to the *Phaedo*. To confine our choice to these works is a *petitio* and will not help us to make progress. The Platonic text that ought to be compared with the section of *Stromateis* VII and thus becomes important also for Origen's *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* is Book X of the *Laws*, where in 903b1–905a4 Plato spells out the particular mode of operation that befits divine *πρόνοια*<sup>12</sup>. Hort and Mayor in their edition with commentary of *Stromateis* VII and after them Otto Stählin, when editing the entire work<sup>13</sup>, made the most conscientious effort to identify everywhere the Platonic – as well as of course biblical and other – passages that influence Clement's phrasing. Unfortunately they found only a few sentences in *Laws* X. Twenty-seven years later Stählin in Volume IV of his edition presented “*Nachträge und Berichtigungen*”, in which (pp. LXVf.) he cites four additional passages of *Laws* X. Taken together these references provide almost

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<sup>9</sup> If the existence or continuity of the “school” is questioned, I should be satisfied with assuming a continuous tradition. We shall return to the question at the end of this paper.

<sup>10</sup> In citing Clement I refer in accordance with the prevailing custom to the paragraphs and if necessary to pages and lines (but not to chapters) of Otto Stählin's edition. *Stromateis* I–VI are available in a third edition (revised by L. Früchtel, Berlin 1960), whereas at the time of writing (October 1968) the new edition of Books VII and VIII, although announced, has not yet appeared. Vol. IV (“Register”) was published by Stählin in 1936.

<sup>11</sup> (See above n. 3) 199. See also his *Introduction au système d'Origène* (Paris 1932) 16ff.

<sup>12</sup> Theiler, *op. cit.* 18ff. cites passages of this section, showing himself alive to its importance for Origen (and for Plotinus 42ff.). See also Hal Koch, *op. cit.* (see above n. 8) 191–201 for some excellent observations about *Legg.* X as authority for Origen and Cadiou, *Jeunesse* 78 for the valuable but as far as I can see isolated suggestion that Origen ever since his formative years was familiar with *Stromateis* VII. W. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clem. Alex.* (Leipzig/Berlin 1952) 394f. seems to me to turn in the wrong direction.

<sup>13</sup> F. J. A. Hort and J. B. Mayor, *Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies Book VII* (London 1902). For Stählin see n. 10.

everything that we need. Since my own observations were made without knowledge of the “Nachträge”, I welcome the confirmation. What remains to be done is to study the use made of Plato’s scheme and to appraise the significance which it acquires when transposed by Clement and Origen into a surrounding of Christian thoughts.

We may begin by examining the echoes recorded by Hort-Mayor and Stählin in their actual editions. In *Stromateis* VII 14, 4 ff. Clement is defending a tenet of long standing in Greek philosophy: God is not in need of anything. Besides the *οὐκ ἐνδεές* Clement stresses God’s indifference to pleasure and to gain or possessions in general (15, 1). There simply is no possibility of influencing God; in this respect he resembles good men (*καλοῖς καγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι*) οἱ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄν ποτε προδοῦεν ἢ φόβου ἔνεκεν ἢ δώρων ὑποσχέσει μείζονων (ibid.). Quite correctly Stählin compares Legg. 907 a 7 where Plato, while dealing with what is essentially the same topic, points out how irrational it is to think of the gods as open to bribes. We ought not to regard them as inferior to various categories of mortal beings, including ἀνθρώποι μέσοι, οἱ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄν ποτε προδοῖεν ἔνεκα δώρων offered them by wicked men. The similarity of the thought is as obvious as the close resemblance in the wording. However, this comparison should serve us merely as a prelude for the far more significant conclusions suggested by the parallels that Hort-Mayor and Stählin record for the two following sentences.

In these Clement proceeds from the particular error which he has refuted to three fundamentally wrong human attitudes. There are men who do not believe in God at all or who while admitting his existence deny his all-embracing providence (*πανεπίσκοπον*), and there are others who live in the conviction *παραιτητοῦς εἶναι θυσίαις καὶ δώροις τοῦς νομιζομένους θεοῦς* (15, 3). The reference in the last sentence to gods in the plural and as *νομιζόμενοι θεοί* may strike us as a “give-away”; yet even without it we would know where Clement found these three types of error. As Hort-Mayor’s and Stählin’s notes show, the same three errors are specified in Legg. X 885 b 4–9<sup>14</sup>, where they are Plato’s varieties of atheism. Still, the mere indication of the parallel does not take us very far unless we bear in mind the importance of 885 b 4–9 for Book X of the *Laws* as a whole. By distinguishing the three aberrations and formulating each of them Plato states the subject of the entire Book which is devoted to the refutation of all three varieties. Arguing against one after the other, Plato provides the first comprehensive proofs in Greek philosophy for 1. the existence of the gods, 2. their all-embracing providence and 3. their

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<sup>14</sup> I gather from Hort-Mayor that this passage of *Laws* X is also cited in the commentary of J. Potter (Oxford 1715); to my regret I cannot follow up this reference. – The words ἢ τὸ δεύτερον, ὄντα ... which in Plato introduce the second error correspond to Clement’s ἢ ὄντα (μὴ εἶναι πανεπίσκοπον): the second group admits God’s existence but denies his providence. As for the experiences that lead men to this denial, Clement 15, 2f. recognizes a larger variety than Plato; still *δυσχεραίνοντες τοῖς γιγνομένοις πρὸς τῆς ἀπαιδεύτου ἀδικίας* (15, 2) may be a brief summary of what Plato 899 d 6–900 a 6 sets forth at considerable length.

superiority to gifts, bribes, or any kind of attempt of making them partners in an injustice committed by man<sup>15</sup>.

If the sentence in Laws X 885 b is of such strategic importance, Clement's familiarity with it inevitably sets us wondering how much more he knew of that Book. At this point a third parallel indicated by Stählin proves helpful. For a close word-by-word comparison of man's three cardinal errors as formulated by Plato and by Clement shows a slight departure in the latter's phrasing. Where Plato defining the third type of atheists speaks of them as considering the gods *εὐπαραμύθητοι*<sup>16</sup>, Clement has instead the word *παραιτητοί*. Although the one word is as good for its purpose as the other, Stählin's references<sup>17</sup> to Legg. X 905 d, 906 d, 908 e, and 909 a show that *παραιτητοί* is by no means an arbitrary substitution on the part of Clement but is used by Plato himself where he actually comes to grips with this erroneous opinion. Thus what Clement knew of Laws X must have been considerably more than its *πρόθεσις*, the general statement of its content that he found in 886 and saw fit to use for his own ends.

The value of the parallel which Stählin cites for Stromateis VII 6, 5 is more difficult to assess. Clement has at this point turned to Christ's providence and care for man; his more specific problem is whether or not this care extends to all men. If it does not embrace all, the reason could be either lack of power or unwillingness. Both possibilities are no sooner mentioned than rejected. In the corresponding section of Laws X the view taken of God's *βούλεσθαι* and *δύνασθαι* is the same<sup>18</sup>, but the alternative is never stated in as pointed a form as by Clement. What seems to have impressed Stählin is the occurrence of certain words, notably *τρουφή* and *ῥάθυμος* – to which we may from slightly later sentences add *ἄγνοια* and *ἡδονή* – as motives that theoretically speaking might account for divine negligence<sup>19</sup>. The same motives figure in the discussion of the Laws, where they are similarly re-

<sup>15</sup> See for the successive treatment of these topics *Legg.* X 885 e 7–899 d 4; 899 d 5–905 c 7; 905 c 7–907 b 4. Cf. my book *Plato's Theology* (Cornell Studies in Class. Philol. XXVII, Ithaca N.Y., 1942, reprinted 1967) 133–174. – In *Strom.* I 165, 1, one of the numerous passages that indicate a more than casual acquaintance with the *Laws*, Clement speaks of Plato as having derived his *νομοθεσία* from Moses (cf. V 10, 2; 29, 3; VI 123, 2). If this was his belief, he could surely draw on the *Laws* with a good conscience. The best known instance is *Strom.* V 92, 5f. where the bad World-Soul of *Legg.* X 896 df. serves him as evidence for the existence of the Devil; cf. Wilamowitz, *Plato* I 695.

<sup>16</sup> 885 b 8. For the subject matter Hort-Mayor compare also *Resp.* II 365 f.

<sup>17</sup> ad 15, 4; 11, 28. Note also *ἀπαραίτητοι* in *Legg.* 907 b 6. Clement also has the word *δώροις* instead of Plato's *εὐχαίς* (cf. for *δώροις* also 15, 1; 11, 21). We have satisfied ourselves regarding the Platonic authority of *δῶρα* in this context. Since prayer retains or even increases its value in the outlook of the Christian gnostic (cf. Völker, op. cit. 409ff. 546ff.), Clement had good reasons for keeping it here out of the discussion.

<sup>18</sup> See esp. 902 c 8ff.; cf. d 3; e 7f. and for other affirmations of God's *δύνασθαι* 901 c 2ff., d 7f., 902 c 5ff. Did Clement in the passage under discussion write *ἢ τῶ μὴ δύνασθαι <βουλόμενος> ... ἢ τῶ μὴ βούλεσθαι δυνάμενος?* It may be safer not to render him too elegant.

<sup>19</sup> 6, 5; 7, 3. 5.

jected<sup>20</sup>. Against this agreement we may set the absence in Clement of much that is essential for Plato, in particular of his elaborate proof that it is wrong to think of the gods as including in their care only large matters but neglecting human affairs as too small for their *φροντίζειν*<sup>21</sup>. Clement, we should grant, finds himself in a different historical situation and in correspondence with it has something different to prove: "How would (Christ) be the savior and the lord if he were not the savior and the lord of all men", i.e. not only of Christians but also of pagans? In other words, his *φροντίζειν* extends to both, even if in somewhat different fashion<sup>22</sup>. Considering the arguments pro and con, Stählin's parallel would still seem valid, even without the decisive support which it receives from the similarity of the central topics which we shall now try to bring out<sup>23</sup>.

In a context where we looked for it we did not find Clement repeating Plato's thought that God's care extends not only to large but also to small objects. Yet very soon afterwards the Son<sup>24</sup> is described as *οὐδὲ τὸ μικρότατον ἀπολείπων τῆς ἑαυτοῦ διοικήσεως ἀφρόντιστον* (9, 1). Here we also learn why his care embraces everything, no matter how small it may be; otherwise *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ ὅλον εἶδε εἰργασμένον*. Every part, even the smallest is important for the well-being of the whole. This thought may again be more adequately expressed by Plato than it is by Clement, but we cannot fail to notice the close correspondence in meaning and words of the two sentences here subjoined:

Legg. 903 b 4

τῷ τοῦ παντός ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσ-  
ῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.

Strom. VII 12, 2

πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου σωτηρίαν τῷ τῶν ὅλων κυρίῳ πάντα ἐστὶ διατεταγμένα καὶ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους.

On *σωτηρία* and what it means to Clement we shall have to say more later on<sup>25</sup>. Clement continues to speak of the *σωτήριος δικαιοσύνη*, defining in the next sentence as its task to advance everything, i. e. every part, and to lead it "toward the better". How is this brought about? Once more we read of the *σωτηρία τοῦ κρείττονος καὶ διαμονή*. This being the objective toward which everything is oriented, *ἀναλόγως τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἡθέσιν διοικεῖται καὶ τὰ μικρότερα* (12, 3). Whatever the

<sup>20</sup> See 900 e 10; 901 a 3; c 1; e 4-7; for *ἄγνοια* see 902 a 6f.; for *ἡδονή* *ibid.* b 1. Another motivation likewise rejected by Clement is *φθόνος*; see below p. 240.

<sup>21</sup> 900 c 8-903 a 8. Cf. *Plato's Theology* 151.

<sup>22</sup> 7,5 (however the trend of the entire argument in VII 6-8 should be taken into account).

<sup>23</sup> For what follows cf. Stählin's "Nachträge und Berichtigungen" (vol. IV p. LXVI).

<sup>24</sup> He is here called *δύναμις πατρική*. We should not criticize Clement for speaking of him one moment as *ὡς εἰπεῖν πατρική τις ἐνέργεια* and the next as *δύναμις πατρική*. Because the Son puts into effect the Father's will, he is for Clement (8, 5) the *πρωτουργὸς κινήσεως δύναμις*. Hort-Mayor and Stählin aptly compare with these words the *πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις* of *Legg.* X 897 a.

<sup>25</sup> See below pp. 238. 244f.

κρεῖττον may be<sup>26</sup>, we hardly err if we identify Clement's *μικρότερα* with Plato's *μέρη*. The sentence just quoted indicates how the "smaller things" or parts are treated by the just ruler who is ordering and organizing everything for the best. In each instance the treatment corresponds to the moral condition. As we might suspect and as indeed the following sentences make clear, the "parts" of which we have read are souls. Shortly afterwards Clement speaks explicitly of souls. Souls, he here tells us, have free choice. It will be well to examine Clement's actual words: *αὐτίκα μεταβάλλει πᾶν τὸ ἐνάρετον εἰς ἀμείνους* (*ἀμείνω* Ms.: em. W. Dindorf) *οἰκῆσεις, τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν τὴν αἴρεσιν τῆς γνώσεως ἔχον ἢν αὐτοκρατορικὴν ἐκέκτητο ἢ ψυχὴ* (12, 4).

In considering this sentence we must remember its place in the larger context of Clement's argument. The sentence informs us how the preservation of the "whole" is effected. The "saving" or "preserving" justice (*σωτήριος δικαιοσύνη*) operates by treating souls in accordance with their deserts. A soul of good moral quality (*ἐνάρετος*) changes to a better home, an *ἀμείνων οἰκῆσις*, as Clement here puts it, or a *βελτίων ... ἐν τῷ παντὶ τάξις*, as he says in an earlier sentence (10, 1; 9, 2). These changes are caused by the souls themselves; for they have freedom of choice (*αἴρεσις*).

If this choice (*αἴρεσις*) relates to *γνώσις*, the true knowledge of God, we should bear in mind that the subject of Book VII (as announced in its first sentence) is the true Christian gnostic who differs from, and is superior to, the *πιστικός* who lives by faith. This of course is a specific doctrine of Clement or of his Alexandrian school. We cannot expect to find anything analogous in Plato. But apart from this word or motif, everything that we read in the sentence of 12, 4 is Platonic and has its parallel or rather its origin in the account of divine *πρόνοια* in Laws X.

changes to a better place of souls that deserve it, the relation of this *μεταβολή* to the preservation of the world order, divine justice and providence as watching over this order, the responsibility of the soul itself, and its free choice are ideas again and again formulated in Laws X 903 b 4–904 e<sup>27</sup>. After the sentence in Legg. 903 b 4 ff. quoted above (p. 234), Plato explains that the organizing and preserving Providence, especially when effecting changes (*μετατιθέναι*), is not concerned with material elements but with the actions of human souls (*ἐμψύχους ... πράξεις* 904 a 6)<sup>28</sup>. In these actions of souls there is both virtue and vice. So far we have read in

<sup>26</sup> See p. 244.

<sup>27</sup> See e.g. (in addition to passages quoted elsewhere in this paper) 903 d 6 where the divine *ἔργον* is defined as *μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γιγνόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον, χεῖρον δ' εἰς τὸν χείρονα κατὰ τὸ πρόβρον αὐτῶν ἕκαστον* or 904 b 6ff. *μεμηγάνηται δὲ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο* (understand *πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶν*, but the text is sound; cf. 923 b 5) *τὸ ποῖόν τι γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ ποῖαν ἔδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ ποῖου τινὸς ἀφῆκε* (scil. God) *ταῖς βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας*.

<sup>28</sup> Clement seems to take this for granted. His thought is not moving within a cosmological framework. For all subjects of this kind a book dealing with the reception of Greek *φιλοσοφῆματα* about soul in early Christianity (see n. 7) would be most helpful.

Clement only of virtuous (ἐνάρετοι 12, 4) souls; what he has to say about bad or weak souls will engage us later. Continuing our comparison between Plato and Clement we next select two passages from the argument of the Laws as offering significant parallels to the last sentence of Clement that we have quoted in full (12, 4; see above p. 235). Legg. X 905 c 6 ff. reads as follows: μεταβάλλει μὲν τοίνυν πάνθ' ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστιν ψυχῆς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν, μεταβάλλοντα<sup>29</sup> δὲ φέρεται κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἴμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον. The subject of thought in both authors – and in Clement also the grammatical subject – is ψυχή, and in both soul is emphatically declared to be the cause of the change, τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν, as they put it in identical words. These changes determine the status of soul, its next place in the all-embracing τάξις. The one motif which does not recur in Clement and would probably not appeal to his Christian mind is Plato's εἴμαρμένη. Moreover Plato, unlike Clement in the sentence which we compare, does not yet concentrate on good or virtuous souls and their change to a better place. Only step by step does he in the following sentences that distinguish different kinds of μεταβολαί<sup>30</sup> make his way to the soul outstanding in ἀρετή: 904 d 6: ὁπόταν μὲν ἀρετῇ θεία προσμείξασα (scil. ψυχή) γίγνηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλεν τόπον ἄγιον ὄλον, μετακομισθεῖσα εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον<sup>31</sup>. The ἀμείνων τόπος of this sentence corresponds to the ἀμείνων οἴκησις of the virtuous soul in the passage of Clement, but if it is considered desirable to find the actual words ἀμείνων τόπος in Clement and in addition some further verbal agreements with this Platonic sentence, Strom. VII 13, 1; 10, 6 ff. will provide us with parallels to our heart's content: ἐκείνας φημι τὰς γνωστικὰς ψυχὰς (passing by many other phases of the hierarchy) ἀγίας ἐν ἀγίαις λογισθείσας καὶ μετακομισθείσας ὄλας ἐξ ὄλων εἰς ἀμείνους ἀμεινόνων τόπων τόπους ἀφικομένας see God no longer ἐν κατόπτροις but enjoy τὴν θεωρίαν ... τὴν θείαν ἐναργῆ ... καὶ εἰλικρινῆ forever.

Obviously Clement here transfers to the gnostics, who for him are the elect and decidedly surpassing all others in ἀρετή, the fate after death described in the Platonic

<sup>29</sup> Perhaps μεταβαλόντα? Cf. my arguments in H. Dahlmann and R. Merkelbach (editt.), *Studien zur Textgeschichte und Textkritik, Günther Jachmann gewidmet* (Köln-Opladen 1959) 273ff. with n. 14 and now also Theiler, op. cit. 17.

<sup>30</sup> They may be larger or smaller, to the better or to the worse (904 c 8–d 4). In this instance Origen (*De princ.* I 6, 2; 80, 15 K.) offers a better parallel than Clement.

<sup>31</sup> For a very similar thought see *Phaedo* 114 b 6–c 2 where Plato describes the fate after death awaiting those οἱ ... ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι. Clement quotes that passage *Strom.* IV 37, 2; but this time his words are much closer to *Legg.* 904 d 6. – Fascinating historical perspectives open up, especially if *Strom.* IV 150, 1 is additionally taken into account. In the original “Pythagorean” version the last – or in any case the desirable last – stage in the process of transmigration was deification. Clement's gnostic too may become “god” (θεός; for Origen and other Platonists see Theiler p. 29 n. 53). At *Strom.* IV 150 he aptly quotes in support of this hope Emped. B 146 D.-K. side by side with *Ps.* 81, 6. Cf. also with the final μετὰ θεῶν δίαίτα (*VII* 56, 3) of the true gnostic Emped. B 147 ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιος (not by accident this fragment too is preserved by Clement, *Strom.* V 122, 3). Theiler 43 refers to the quotation of Emped. B 124 in *Plot.* IV 7, 10, 38. In his *Kaiser Marc Aurel, Wege zu sich selbst* (Zurich 1951) 310 he deals with related subjects. See also *Phaedo* 82 b 10.



text. For in Plato too this fate is reserved for the best souls, the class familiar with, and therefore assimilated to, divine *ἀρετή*. The words *ἅγιος, μετακομισθεῖσα, ὄλος*<sup>32</sup>, *ἀμείνων τόπος* are borrowed from the Platonic passage which inspired Clement's conception. To use each of them once, as Plato had done, would evidently not satisfy him. Besides "improving" on Plato by means of his stylistic exuberance, he has given the thought a Christian slant. But how far has the Christianization actually gone? Noticing the emphasis given to *θεωρία* and reading of souls *τὴν θεωρίαν ἀσπαζομένης τὴν θείαν* (13, 1; 10, 11 ff.) and *εἰλικρινῆ ... ἐστιωμένης (τὴν) θέαν* (ibid.), we begin to wonder whether Clement has really travelled a long distance from Plato. Did he not derive the idea of souls "feasting" on a vision from the *Phaedrus* (247 e 3) and does not a slightly earlier passage (9, 4; 8, 27 f.) where souls *περικαταρρέουσιν ἐλιχθέντες τοῖς πάθεσιν καὶ ἀποπίπτουσι χαμαὶ* recall the myth and imagery of the same dialogue<sup>33</sup>? Granted that Clement does not equip the souls with wings, the last words quoted acquire their full meaning only when we remember how in the *Phaedrus* a soul of inferior quality *βαρυνθεῖσα περρορνήσῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ* (248 c 7 f.). However for our present purpose such observations are of minor importance. For that Clement's mind is steeped in Platonic thought and language is after all a matter of general agreement among his students. What has so far not been properly appreciated is his specific debt to the description of divine Providence in *Laws X*. We shall therefore refrain from studying the conflation of passages that Clement found in this Book with such drawn from other Platonic dialogues – or the conflation of Platonic and biblical passages – and shall not dwell on the transformation of the "pure in heart" into a category enjoying the purest form of *θεωρία*, nor record how often Clement for the soul's freedom of choice avails himself of the locus classicus in *Republic X* (617 d) *αἰτία ἐλομένον. θεὸς ἀναίτιος*<sup>34</sup> rather than of the wording given to the same thought in *Laws X*.

A specific thought that Clement could find in no Platonic work other than *Laws X* is the idea of *ἄρχοντες* appointed by the divine Providence to every part of the "whole" (903 b 7 ff.): *τούτοις (scil. τοῖς μέρεσι) δ' εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἐκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπεργασόμενοι*<sup>35</sup>. If Clement looked to Plato for authoritative support of his hierarchy, no other passage could serve him equally well, and we may now, with Plato's words in our mind, turn to the version of this doctrine that helps him to explain how Providence embraces even the "smallest" part. At VII 9, 2

<sup>32</sup> A. Diès' change of *ἅγιον ὄλον* in the Platonic passage (904 e 1) to *ἀγίαν ὁδόν* conflicts with Clement's "testimony"; if the conjecture were particularly attractive, we would have to assume a rather early corruption.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Hort-Mayor, op. cit. 218, and R. Cadiou, *Introduction* (see above n. 11) 25.

<sup>34</sup> *Resp.* X 617 d is familiar to Clement throughout his writings. See e.g. *Strom.* I 4, 1 with Stählin's notes; IV 150, 4; V 136, 4 and Stählin's "Zitatenregister" (vol. IV p. 52). Cf. Hal Koch, op. cit. 203 on the doctrine of freedom in Origen and *Legg.* X as one of its sources.

<sup>35</sup> *ἀπειργασόμενοι* Mss. I have accepted Wilamowitz's emendation (*Plato* II 403; see also I 700). Cf. *Epinomis* 984 d–985 c.

Clement discusses the divine πάντων τῶν μερῶν ... ἐξέτασις; repeating the crucial word πάντων he continues: πάντων (scil. τῶν μερῶν) εἰς τὸν πρῶτον διοικητὴν τῶν ὄλων ἐκ θελήματος πατρὸς κυβερνῶντα τὴν πάντων σωτηρίαν ἀφορώντων<sup>36</sup>, ἑτέρων ὑφ' ἑτέρους ἡγουμένους τεταγμένων ... The thought is less involved than the sentence makes it appear. All entities look to, and orient themselves toward, Christ, the administrator of the whole; in accordance with the Father's will he directs the πάντων σωτηρία; the hierarchy itself offers a pattern of subordination. About this subordination we learn more in the next sentence, which after indicating the place assigned to the angels<sup>37</sup>, assures us: καὶ δὴ μέχρις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἄλλοι ὑπ' ἄλλοις ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ δι' ἑνὸς σωζόμενοί τε καὶ σώζοντες διατετάχεται. What makes the agreement with Plato significant is not the hierarchy as such – for this had by Clement's time become a philosophical commonplace – but σωτηρία as the end and goal pursued by the divine administrator himself as well as by the elaborate hierarchy operating in his service. Plato describes the overall administrator as shaping everything πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν (καὶ ἀρετὴν) τοῦ ὄλου. Clement's τὴν πάντων σωτηρίαν corresponds to this, if we are willing to ignore the slight nuance between τοῦ ὄλου<sup>38</sup> and πάντων. Far more important than this difference is the meaning which σωτηρία has for the two authors. In Plato the word may be adequately rendered by “preservation”, but when we are dealing with a Christian thinker it would surely be naive to suppose that the word means no more than this. Did Clement then backed by Plato's authority, envisage “the salvation of everybody”? We are not yet prepared to enter upon this momentous question but must keep it in mind and come back to it in due course.

What we may do now is to turn from individual passages to the development of Clement's argument as a whole. In the first sentence of Book VII he declares that the καιρός has come for introducing to the Greeks his gnostic as the true and only worshipper of God. Addressing himself to the philosophers, he recognizes the necessity of using arguments of a more distinct or more articulate<sup>39</sup> type, which their own παιδεία should enable them to understand. The prophecies of the Scriptures will not now be mentioned, even if their meaning determines the outlines of the Christian religion as Clement is about to present it. The last statement is intended to reassure the simple believers, some of whom may find his doctrines “strange” (ἑτεροῖα 1, 4; 3, 18). After reading this Introduction we should be prepared to see him move on a particularly high intellectual level.

Shortly afterwards the hierarchy begins to unfold. In it the Son as being most perfect and most holy – actually four more superlatives are applied to him – must

<sup>36</sup> ἀφορώντων Hort: ἐφορώντων Ms.

<sup>37</sup> This place is “on the highest point of the visible” scil. world (ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ φαινόμενου τῶ ἄκρω 9, 3), which suggests that like Plato (and like Origen after him) Clement is distinguishing between the empirical Cosmos and a νοητὸς κόσμος.

<sup>38</sup> Legg. 903 b 4 ff. Note that this phrase occurs in the sentence (written out above p. 234) immediately preceding 903 b 7 ff., the last Platonic passage we have quoted.

<sup>39</sup> ἐναργεστεροίς ... τοῖς λόγοις (1, 2).

as a matter of course occupy the place closest to God Father. The Son is the teacher and educator of mankind and it is he with whom Providence must be associated: *ἐντεῦθεν ἡ πρόνοια ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ καὶ πανταχοῦ* (6, 1). Providence thus becomes Clement's subject. To describe its operation in a manner worthy of the divine majesty he turns to the Laws. Like Plato, he excludes every reason why Providence should not be all-embracing, and like Plato he assures us: "not even the smallest is omitted from the divine care; for otherwise the whole would no longer be a good work" (9, 1). Here, at a point corresponding to the juncture where Plato introduced the *ἄρχοντες*, Clement waxes more eloquent about his Christian hierarchy, and where Plato is emphatic on the place and function of everything down to the smallest part within the "whole", Clement follows him very closely except for putting the "administrator of the whole" in the place which the argument of Laws X assigns to the "whole" itself. As we have seen, Clement found in Laws X even *σωτηρία*, a word of special appeal to his Christian mind and almost bound to acquire heightened importance. Gradually the pattern of the comprehensive *πρόνοια* emerges more distinctly. Its exclusive concern with souls, pointed out (though hardly proved) by Plato, is taken for granted by Clement. On three other fundamental convictions they are found in agreement: 1. Each soul is treated on the basis of its moral record. 2. The decisions regarding their moral conduct are left to the souls themselves; theirs is the *βούλησις*, the *αἴρεσις*, the *αἰτία*<sup>40</sup>. 3. A soul which has become better is given a correspondingly better place (*τάξις*, *τόπος*, *οἴκησις*) in "the whole"; a soul which has weakened and deteriorated sinks to a lower level. To these basic agreements we may add as a more specific conception common to both the surpassingly wonderful place to which souls of outstanding quality are transferred.

It has seemed convenient to combine the report about Clement's argument with the evidence for his debt to the second demonstration in Laws X. On the whole the latter of these two tasks has proved easier and has perhaps also been accomplished more adequately. For the peculiar complexity of Clement's reasoning and of his style makes it difficult to extract the "essence" of his argument. Basic as the inspiration derived from the Laws must have been for the new pattern of the savior's operations, Clement so far from simply reproducing Plato's teachings, has modified them and interspersed them with thoughts of a different provenience. For his tendency to modify the Platonic original one illustration – perhaps the most striking, certainly the most convenient to describe – will here suffice: Where following Plato he rejects all theoretically conceivable reasons why anything should be neglected by Providence, these reasons are almost, but not quite, the same in both authors<sup>41</sup>. Besides those specified and dismissed by Plato, Clement

<sup>40</sup> See e.g. *αἰρεῖσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἀρετήν* 9, 4; 8, 28f.; *αἴρεσις* as *αἰτία* 12, 4 (cf. again Plat., *Resp.* 617 e); for *αἴρεσις* and *αἰρεῖσθαι* see also 6, 3; 8, 5; 10, 1; 11, 3; 12, 1.

<sup>41</sup> See for these reasons (lack of power, lack of good will, ignorance, easy-going indifference, and pleasure) above p. 233.

also takes up jealousy (*φθόνος* 7, 1 f.). To repudiate this motive is certainly no serious departure from the Platonic basis; for, as everybody knows, *φθόνος ἔξω θείου χοροῦ (ἴσταται)*<sup>42</sup> is the fountainhead of innumerable later statements to the same effect. Decidedly non-Platonic is however the ground on which ignorance is excluded. It does not “touch” the Son who is the Father’s Wisdom (*Σοφία*) and the *Λόγος* and who was with the Father before the creation of the world (7, 4). Another modification noticeable in the same context has already been mentioned: Clement interprets Plato’s arguments and assertions that the divine *πρόνοια* extends to everything as suggesting the inclusion of all human beings, pagans as well as believers, in the savior’s providence<sup>43</sup>.

Far more could be said about the thoughts which Clement has introduced from non-Platonic sources and which he as often as not has tried to amalgamate by giving them Platonic dress and color (any phrase he remembered from the dialogues would help for this purpose). Here we must proceed in a highly selective manner. Leaving undiscussed other topics large and small that it would be profitable to follow up, we shall concentrate on a few particularly important motifs, some of them Christian pure and simple, some reflecting Clement’s own very personal preferences and beliefs. First however we must explore how far the Platonic text facilitated their incorporation.

Anyone at all familiar with Plato would know how to understand what he reads in *Laws X* about changes in the status of souls, about souls being assigned to a better or worse fate, and about such changes being due and corresponding to a good or bad moral record in their most recent life. Inevitably he will interpret these changes – the *μεταβολαί* and the *μετατιθέσθαι* again and again spoken of<sup>44</sup> – as referring to incarnations in bodies of higher and lower standing, i.e. to the Pythagorean doctrine adopted by Plato in the *Meno* and set forth repeatedly afterwards, usually in the medium of a myth<sup>45</sup>. In *Laws X* too the section which enlightens us about the operations of divine *ἐπιμέλεια* is introduced as a myth (as *ἐπωδοὶ μῦθοι*, to be exact, 903 b 1); as such it is meant to reinforce the preceding rational arguments. Quite probably it is correct to interpret this myth in terms of reincarnation as we know it from the *Meno* and the myths in *Phaedo*, *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. Still, if we look through our section for definite support of this interpretation, the result is meagre. What is not open to doubt is the concern – in fact, it would seem, exclusive concern – of Providence with the souls<sup>46</sup>. If we ask for more, the sentence

<sup>42</sup> *Phaedr.* 247 a 7.

<sup>43</sup> See above p. 234.

<sup>44</sup> 903 d 4f.; d 6 (904 a 2); 904 c 6–9; c 9–d 1; d 7.

<sup>45</sup> See esp. *Meno* 81 aff.; *Phaedo* 81 c–82 b; 83 df.; 107 df.; 113 a; *Resp.* X 614 b ff.; esp. 617 d ff.; 619 b ff.; *Phaedr.* 248 c–249 b; *Tim.* 42 a–d; 90 e 7–91 a 1; 91 d 6–92 c 3. Cf. e.g. H. S. Long, *A study of the doctrine of metempsychosis in Greece from Pythagoras to Plato* (Princeton 1948).

<sup>46</sup> See 903 e 3–904 b 6. The text presents some difficulties, for which see the apparatus and notes in A. Diès’ Budé édition (Paris 1956). For 903 e 6 cf. my proposal in the *Festschrift für Jachmann* (cited above n. 29) 271 f.

903 d 3–e 1 calls for our attention: ἐπεὶ δὲ αἰὲν ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι τότε μὲν ἄλλω, τότε δὲ ἄλλω μεταβάλλει παντοίας μεταβολὰς ... οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεττευτῆ (the dice-player of Heraclitus B 52) λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γιγνόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον, χειρὸν δ' εἰς τὸν χειρόνα ... Another reference (904 a 6) to ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα as a combination characteristic of men – or perhaps rather of men and of gods as the latter are known to “conventional” religion – raises more problems<sup>47</sup> than it can help us to solve. However obvious it may seem to us that the μετακοσμήσεις in Laws X are reincarnations, Plato himself throughout this “myth” speaks of souls as taking up new “places” or receiving a different status in the over-all τάξις; that they enter new bodies he takes for granted (at 903 d 3f.).

As in the present study we are not primarily concerned with Plato, all we can do is to admit a new orientation of his thought<sup>48</sup>. Returning to Clement, we must allow that he had every excuse for keeping silent on a topic barely mentioned in the text he had chosen to follow<sup>49</sup>. Whether or not his Platonism would have allowed him to accept reincarnation (as in the next generation Origen actually did) is a gratuitous speculation. We have satisfied ourselves how close to the authoritative account of Laws X he keeps in describing changes of “place” or rank in the over-all world-order maintained by divine Providence, and the only legitimate question is whether the Platonic conception has in Clement’s scheme acquired a new meaning.

Here the answer is not altogether simple. We may begin by quoting VII 10, 2, where Plato’s changes of place turn into stages by which the divine salvation “revolves”: αὐται αἰ σωτήριοι περιτροπαὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς τάξιν ἀπομερίζονται καὶ χρόνοις καὶ τόποις καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ γνώσεσι καὶ κληρονομίαις καὶ λειτουργίαις ...

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<sup>47</sup> I am not sure that a fully satisfactory explanation of 904 a 7–b 2 has been found. Our divine king saw ... ἀνώλεθρον δ' ὄν γενόμενον (if the text is intact, this would be a deliberate oxymoron) ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί ... (the text continues: for if either of the two, i.e. either body or soul, were destroyed living beings could no longer arise). The best I am able to suggest is this: Body continues forever and so does soul, but they experience countless separations and new combinations. By contrast in the gods body and soul remain eternally united. Thus they are an αἰώνιον. Since in *Tim.* 41 b a god of another kind by his will guarantees this eternity, our exegesis does not conflict with that passage. See however H. Görgemanns, *Beiträge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi* (Zetemata 25, 1960) 204, in whose view οὐκ αἰώνιον applies also to the gods of the law. The meaning of οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί is obvious and firmly established (pace E. Dönt, *Hermes* 96 [1968] 391).

<sup>48</sup> The τόπος motif as used in *Phaedo* 82 a 10ff. has no bearing on our question. Essential for the new orientation is the relationship between the whole and its parts. Cf. *Plato's Theology* 152ff. Basically the same relationship had in the *Republic* been applied to the new πόλις.

<sup>49</sup> A promise to treat the problem of μετενσωμάτωσις is made in *Strom.* IV 85, 3 but as far as we can see not implemented. However Photius (*Bibl. cod.* 109) to his great disgust found in the *Hypotyposes* of Clement not only μετεμψυχώσεις but also “many Cosmoi before Adam”, which would be another tenet putting Clement closer to Origen. I hesitate to use *Ecl.* 57,5 where human beings are envisaged as μεταστάντες εἰς ἀγγέλους or even beyond this stage. *Strom.* VII 46, 5f. suggests the idea of angels having arisen from a lower status and being in danger of falling back (ὀλισθήσαντες αὐτίς χαμαί).

Plato's scheme of changes provides for no differentiation of γνώσεις, of κληρονομίαι, of λειτουργίαι; not even the word τιμή occurs in the section of the Laws (although the concept as such would not be alien to it). No lengthy comment is needed. Clement has translated the Platonic suggestions of higher and lower status into a language specifying aspects of his hierarchy. It is a hierarchy conceived with reference to the true gnostic. Among the words quoted γνώσει is particularly revealing; the latter part of the sentence informs us how close to the Lord the final status and the final θεωρία of the gnostic will be. The ἀνὴρ τέλειος, i.e. the perfect Christian visualized by St. Paul (e.g. Phil. 3, 13), will have γνώσεως ὁμοῦ καὶ κληρονομίας ὑπεροχὴν (9, 4f.)<sup>50</sup>.

We would err if we looked in Clement for a watertight, integrated system of Christian Platonism. He may have hoped to produce something like a consistent, well organized scheme in his *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*; but all we can say about this work with confidence is that he planned to write it<sup>51</sup>. A speculative enterprise of the kind, even if it had not of necessity to take the high flights in which Origen was to engage, can hardly have been congenial to his talents. In the *Stromateis* we see him striking out in a great variety of directions; to harmonize what he says on any particular subject with everything else that relates to the same subject would be both wrong and impossible<sup>52</sup>. The topic of *Stromateis* VII 6ff. is a case in point; for the destiny of the soul is a question to which Clement's writings offer more than one answer. Determined as we are not to make loose ends converge, we may yet scrutinize our section for hints of the other answers.

Among Clement's favorite passages in the Gospels must have been the assurance in John 14, 2 of "many mansions in my Father's house". Although Clement never actually quotes the passage, he alludes to it repeatedly or makes it shine through his own wording<sup>53</sup>. How easily the conception of *μοναὶ πολλαὶ* could be incorporated

<sup>50</sup> This perfect and final condition is often by Clement defined as *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ*, a conception borrowed from *Theaet.* 176 b. Cf. J. Meifort, *Der Platonismus bei Clem. v. Alex.* (Tübingen 1928) 69ff. and pass., a valuable book in which the *Laws* are not neglected, although for *πρόνοια* Meifort refuses to find common ground between Plato and Clement (pp. 62f.). Proper weight is given to the philosophical (Platonic, Stoic, Philonic) as well as to the biblical tradition in Hubert Merki's chapters on Clement and Origen: *Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa*, *Paradosis* vol. 7 (Freiburg i. d. Schweiz 1952) 44ff. 60ff.; see also 83ff.

<sup>51</sup> To me passages like *Strom.* III 13, 1; 21, 2; IV 2, 1; 91, 1; *Quis div. salv.* 26 extr. seem to allow no doubt about his intention; nor would it for practical purposes make an appreciable difference if, as Stählin appears to think (vol. III p. LXIV of his edition), *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* was to be a continuation or even a part of the *Stromateis*. His arguments are far from conclusive. It is astonishing in how many monographs or other studies on Clement there is not a word on his *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*. For a discussion (with bibliographical references) see Johannes Munck, *Untersuchungen über Klemens von Al.* (Stuttgart 1933) 87ff. 99ff. 105ff., where in spite of good observations no final clarity is achieved. E. de Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie* (Paris 1906, reprint 1967) 119f. 120 n. 1. 346ff. seems utterly sound.

<sup>52</sup> See note 58.

<sup>53</sup> The passages adduced in Stählin's "Zitatenregister" (vol. IV) cannot be a complete list. He cites *Strom.* IV 36, 3; VII 57, 5; 88, 3; *Ecl.* 48, 1. Note also e.g. IV 166, 1; VI 105, 1;

into the hierarchy needs no discussion. In our sections of Book VII *μονή* occurs once. At 9, 4 (in a doctrine discussed above p. 235 more fully) we read: *οἱ μὲν ἐνάρετοι οἰκειοῦνται τῇ πρώτῃ μονῇ, ἐφεξῆς δ' ἄλλοι <ἄλλη> μέχρι τῆς τελείας*. Later, while varying and developing the idea, Clement as we know, prefers the word *τόπος*. He could do so with a perfectly good Christian conscience, because in the passage in John 14 Christ, after referring to the *μοναί*, continues: *εἰ δὲ μή, εἶπον ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι πορεύομαι ἐτοιμάσαι τόπον ὑμῖν; καὶ ἐὰν πορευθῶ καὶ ἐτοιμάσω τόπον ὑμῖν, πάλιν ἔρχομαι καὶ παραλήμψομαι ὑμᾶς πρὸς ἑμναυτὸν κτλ*. With this saying of Christ in his mind Clement would know how to understand the *τόποι* in Laws X. Clearly God had seen fit to reveal to Greek philosophy some additional knowledge about the “places” prepared for man.

But what about the doctrine of the last judgment? And what about the concept of Purgatory? The last question has its special point because ever since Gustav Anrich published his important article in the *Festgabe H. F. Holtzmann*<sup>54</sup> Clement and Origen have been considered the creators of the Christian concept of Purgatory. On this score we have nothing to report. Not only is the idea of Purgatory as such absent from this part of Book VII but we also look in vain for an occurrence of *καθαίρειν*, *κάθαρσις* or related concepts that according to Anrich form the matrix for the doctrine of Purgatory. Regarding the Judgment, Clement is not quite so silent. As we know, it is owing to the soul's own choice, a decision made by it in complete freedom, if in the savior's dispensation it advances to a “better home”. Nevertheless there are *παιδεύσεις* provided by the goodness of the “great Judge” (12, 5), who for this purpose relies on the angels and uses a variety of preliminary judgments (*διὰ ... προκρίσεων ποικίλων*) as well as the final Judgment. If we wonder how far such “necessary educations through judgments”<sup>55</sup> may be consistent with the freedom of choice – emphasized in the immediately preceding sentence – the text suggests that the education is needed to bring about the repentance of the most “despondent” (*ἀπηληγηκότες*, the word of ad Ephes. 4, 19).

108, 2; 109, 3; 110, 1 (sometimes *ἀλλή* serves as synonym for *μονή*). On “many mansions” cf. E. F. Osborn, *The philosophy of Clement of Alexandria* (Cambridge 1957) 80 f.

<sup>54</sup> (Tübingen and Leipzig 1902) 97 ff. See also Hal Koch, op. cit. 93 f. and for a classicist's approach which meets the theological Eduard Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro Aeneis Buch VI* (Leipzig/Berlin) 28 ff.; Norden refers to Anrich only in the Addenda of the later editions and had evidently reached his conclusions in the first (of 1903) independently. – Resurrection of the body is in accordance with Scripture expected *Strom.* VI 47 but would from the discussion *ibid.* not seem to be incompatible with universal salvation. If Clement believed in Heaven and Hell, he can hardly have done so in a literal sense; see e.g. *Strom.* VI 98 f. Cf. Hort-Mayor, op. cit. “Introduction” XXXIX ff. and for a more recent treatment H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* (New York 1961) 42.

<sup>55</sup> On punishment as education see Anrich, loc. cit. 99 ff., where for Clement he refers especially to *Strom.* VI 46, 3 *σωτήριοι καὶ παιδευτικαὶ αἱ κολάσεις τοῦ θεοῦ*, VII 56, 3–5; 78, 3 and for the Platonic background of the idea e.g. to *Resp.* II 380 b; IX 591 b; *Legg.* IX 854 d; see also *Gorg.* 525 b. *Strom.* VII 78,3 is one of the passages that establish a significant relation between *κάθαρσις*, *κόλασις*, and *παιδεύσις*. On the importance of the *παιδεία* motif see Koch pass. (e.g. 159. 305. 322) and Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960).

What would be the outcome of such repentance? Unfortunately at this point (13, 1) Clement using a classical quotation appropriate to the solemn occasion (*τὰ δ' ἄλλα σιγῶ*), decides not to penetrate farther into the mysteries of divine Providence. What he next says bears on a different topic, the future status of the elect. Do we dare to be less discreet? Should there be any prospect for the ultimate salvation of every soul? This was to be Origen's vision of the final status of things, when God will be *πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*. We have started from Origen and mean to return to him. There is no reason why we should keep him any longer out of the discussion. An approximation to his doctrine on the part of Clement would have a certain intrinsic probability.

In principle Christ is for Clement too *πάντων σωτήρ* (7, 6). Moreover we have seen how much it meant to him to find – or shall we say “discover” – the *σωτηρία τοῦ ὅλου* in Laws X; for *σωτηρία* as the end toward which Providence directs everything was bound to take on Christian connotations in Clement's mind. Still is it quite safe to treat “preservation” and “salvation” as being interchangeable concepts for Clement? At 9, 2 we read of “the administrator of the whole who in accordance with the Father's will governs *τὴν πάντων σωτηρίαν*”. This sounds encouraging and so do the immediately following sentences. For they describe the hierarchy as reaching from the angels down to us and consisting of *σωζόμενοι* and *σώζοντες* (9, 3). Next Clement employs the image of the magnet in much the same way as Plato had used it in the *Ion*: by the magnet operating as *ἐν* or principle – he is almost certainly thinking of Christ – many iron rings are forced to move, each becoming attached to the one before it<sup>56</sup>. In the same manner souls are drawn upward, the best to the first “mansion” and so forth in the downward direction – and yet there are those who being weak and unjust fall down to the Earth. According to the last words universal salvation would after all not seem to be a part of Clement's scheme. Other passages in our section are apt to confirm this impression. The bad are left to themselves and those like them (10, 1). “Salvaging justice” improves the lot of every soul “as far as possible” (12, 3; 9, 29). The *σωτηρία τοῦ κρείττονος* (*ibid.*) need not be identical with the *τοῦ ὅλου σωτηρία* and still less with the *πάντων σωτηρία*, which raised such high hopes. To sum up, we are not left with a clear, unambiguous answer<sup>57</sup>. However great hopes a sentence like *πῶς δ' ἂν εἴη σωτήρ καὶ κύριος εἰ μὴ πάντων σωτήρ καὶ κύριος* (7, 6) may arouse, it is hazardous to rely on individual statements of Clement. He may have had good reasons for falling silent at a point where we are most eager to learn more. Once again, integration of all strands or a firm commitment to one solution is not what we should

<sup>56</sup> 9, 3f.; 8, 20–25; cf. Plato, *Ion* 533 d f. (535 e f.). Since the salvation is effected *ἐξ ἑνός καὶ δι' ἑνός*, we may confidently identify this principle with Christ. Still, for the *δύναμις* which Plato 533 d 6, e 3 ascribes to the magnet Clement substitutes the word *πνεῦμα* so that in the next sentences he can describe the souls as drawn upward by the *ἅγιον πνεῦμα*. As I read the passage, it is Christ who “draws” and he does so through the Holy Spirit.

<sup>57</sup> *Ecl.* 56, 3 conveys again a different impression, suggesting that at the end of the present *περίοδος* the “just” (*δίκαιοι* = *πιστοί*) will be united into “one body”.



expect of him<sup>58</sup>. And yet it is important that supported by Legg. 903 b 5 universal salvation has at least appeared on the horizon.

Origen possessed in an extraordinary degree the synthetic power that Clement lacked. His *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* is inspired by Christian convictions but its methods and reasoning are Greek. Its speculative boldness entitles it to a high place in the Greek philosophical tradition. Still, the central ideas of the treatise are those which we have found in Stromateis VII and traced back to Book X of Plato's *Laws*. If we consider them the pillars on which Origen's philosophical edifice rests, it is fortunately not necessary to supply a string of quotations, since it is after all with Origen's name that the doctrines in question are associated. They are recorded even in short accounts of *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*<sup>59</sup>, and their presence in this treatise formed the starting point for our inquiry. Thus one passage may do duty for many others. The sentence here chosen from the beginning of Book II recommended itself because it contains most of the pertinent ideas<sup>60</sup>; beginning with the all-embracing universal salvation it moves on to the operation of the divine *Λόγος*, next asserts – and reasserts – the freedom of the individual will, and finishes by emphasizing the harmony which God produces through giving each part its useful function within the whole: (*opinamur*) *Deum pro salute universarum creaturarum suarum per ineffabilem verbi sui ac sapientiae rationem ita haec singula dispensasse ut et singuli quique spiritus vel animi*<sup>61</sup> ... *non contra arbitrii libertatem vi ... cogerentur et per hoc adimi ab his videretur liberi facultas arbitrii ... et diversi motus propositi earum ad unius mundi consonantiam competenter et utiliter aptarentur, dum alii iuvare indigent, alii iuvare possunt ...* (De princ. II 1, 2; 107, 28 ff. Kötschau). The last clauses recall Clement's *ἄλλοι ὑπ' ἄλλοις ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ δι' ἑνὸς σωζόμενοι καὶ σώζοντες δια-*

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Waszink, *Vig. Christ.* 19 (1965) 154f. As Clement himself remarks at the conclusion of Book VII (111, 3), his work contains side by side *καρποφόρα* and *ἄκαρπα δένδρα*; it is still waiting for the gardener who might make a *παράδεισος* of it. – To the passages bearing on the problem of salvation a few others (e.g. *Strom* VI 47f.; 106, 4) may be added.

<sup>59</sup> See P. Tillich, *A history of Christian thought* (London 1968) 60ff. 63f. for the most recent short account and among earlier works e.g. H. Lietzmann, *Geschichte d. alten Kirche* II (Berlin/Leipzig 1936) 317ff., and also Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte* vol. II ch. 6 I and II. To Hal Koch and Cadiou's books reference has been made repeatedly. See also the third part of Jean Daniélou's *Origène* (Paris 1948) 199–283, and the very valuable discussions of H. Chadwick in *Early Christian Thought* (cf. above n. 54) 66ff. and in the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (1967) 182ff. Henry Crouzel, *Origène et la philosophie* makes a sustained effort to minimize the serious philosophical intention and the systematic character of *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*.

<sup>60</sup> What matters is in fact the combination of all these conceptions (not only in the sentence to be quoted but in the treatise as a whole); for some of the individual ideas, notably freedom of will, transmigration, the hierarchy including mediators between the divine and man, are widely diffused at the time. Since it is not possible to do justice to this large subject, I content myself with referring to Theiler 18 ff. 31 f.; Chadwick, *Cambr. Hist.* 165 (esp. on *δαίμονες*) and H. Dörrie, *Hermes* 85 (1957) 414ff., who observes that Porphyry's denial of a change from human and animal body must be considered a unique position.

<sup>61</sup> For Origen's peculiar view concerning the relation of *spiritus* (*πνεῦμα*) and *animus* (or *anima*, *ψυχή*) see esp. *De princ.* II 8 (3 and pass.).

τετάχεται (Strom. VII 9, 3; cf. above p. 238)<sup>62</sup>, even if the “one” savior is not mentioned in this part of the sentence – he is after all identical with the Λόγος and the Σοφία whose crucial role Origen points out. If anything that we might expect to find in this sentence is missing, it would be the providence motif, but again what is absent is only the word, not the idea. The word itself appears elsewhere (scil. in Rufinus’ Latin translation, yet there is no reason why it should not render πρόνοια), e.g. in the following sentence of II 9 where after another affirmation of the *consonantia* brought about by God the text continues: *Et has causas, ut ego arbitror, mundus iste suae diversitatis accepit, dum unum quemque divina providentia pro varietate motuum suorum vel animorum propositique dispensat* (170, 10 ff.)<sup>63</sup>. The use made of every soul or spirit depends on its *meritum* (*Deus vero cui iam creaturam suam pro merito dispensare iustum videbatur* 170, 5f.). What Origen here calls *meritum* he describes a few lines later as *praecedentes causas*. More precisely, the *creator secundum praecedentes causas pro merito unum quemque distribuit*<sup>64</sup>. If we study these sections (De princ. II 9, 3–8) attentively, we remain in no doubt as to the meaning of *praecedentes causas*. The words refer to previous lives and their moral quality<sup>65</sup>. Origen, as we may gather from these sections – as well as from others in *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* – did accept the Platonic doctrine that Clement, as far as we could find out, had hesitated to make his own; whatever may be said of individual witnesses and individual testimonies for *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, the evidence that reincarnation was an integral part of his scheme is overwhelming<sup>66</sup>.

<sup>62</sup> A similar thought is found also in *De princ.* I 8, 1; 97, 12–15 Köttschau; if the authenticity of the passage is open to question, the “parallel” in Clement should go some way to support it. Cf. also III 5f., esp. Hieron. *Ad Avit.* 9 about helpers in the hierarchy who *ruentibus manum porrigant*. Cadiou, *Introduction* (see above n. 11) 61f. has valuable comments and references. Note for the sake of contrast that in Philo, who is known to have much in common with Clement and Origen, the function of ἄγγελοι is appropriately enough understood as ἀγγέλλειν or διαγγέλλειν (*De plant.* 12ff.; *De somn.* 141f.). Cf. on the subject of ἄγγελοι Theiler 29.

<sup>63</sup> With the diverse *motus* of this passage cf. Justinian’s quotation XII from *De princ.* I (I 6, 2; 80, 15f. K. = *Acta Concil. Oecum.* ed. Ed. Schwartz III 210, 29ff.): κινήματα of the souls consist (or result?) in a μεταπίπτειν ἐπὶ πλεόν ἢ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον – words reminiscent of *Legg.* 904 c 9f.; divine judgment allots for each such movement [καὶ] τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν in the next dispensation. Even in Schwartz’s edition the Greek text is by no means clear and quite possibly corrupt. See Schwartz’s historical account in *Gesammelte Schriften* 4 (Berlin 1960) 297 and n. 2.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. for the *pro merito* motif also I 8; 101, 4ff. We also find in Rufinus the words *pro meriti dignitate* (e.g. II 9, 7; 171, 11; cf. 172, 1; IV 3, 10; 337, 13f.). The corresponding κατ’ ἀξίαν occurs repeatedly in an analogous context of Ammonius (according to the report of Hierocles; see Phot. cod. 251; 463 a 26, 32ff.). It may not be out of place to cite the Stoic definition of δικαιοσύνη as ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἐκάστω (*St. V.F.* 3, 25; 262f.; for more instances see M. Adler’s Index). See also Arist., *Eth. Nic.* V 3, 1131 a 25ff. in conjunction with V 2, 1130b 30ff.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. πρὸς τὴν τῶν προβεβιωμένων ἡμῶν ἀξίαν in the reports about Ammonius in Photius (cod. 214) 172 b 20ff. 39ff. and (cod. 251) 466 a 21.

<sup>66</sup> See I 4; 64, 9–16 K. including the testimonies of St. Jerome whose *Epist.* 124 (*ad Avitum* in CSEL 56, pp. 96ff.) ch. 3 I consider unambiguous and above suspicion; I 7, 93, 28ff. (= Hier. *Ad Avit.* 4; see also the verbatim quotation XV in Justin. III 211, 19ff. Schwartz; according to Hier. 121, 1ff. reincarnation in quadrupeds and fishes was not put forward as a δόγμα but as a πρόβλημα); I 8, 4; 102, 12ff. where Köttschau’s presentation is somewhat confusing but

To Origen's firm belief in the ultimate salvation of every soul we referred on an earlier occasion, contrasting his determined attitude with the absence of a clear commitment in Clement<sup>67</sup>. Again we may spare the effort of presenting numerous passages; for this is one of his best known – and was soon to become one of his most notorious – tenets. Origen extends salvation to every sinner, to every demon ranking on his scale below man, in fact even to the devil. All of them will in the end be restored to the pristine condition. God has “created all” (souls) “free” and “equal”<sup>68</sup>, the former predicate meaning in Origen's scheme that all are endowed with free will. According to the use they make of this will, some fall farther and lower than others, and, in correspondence to the distance from God (which at the same time is distance from the *ἔν*, from perfect goodness, and reality) they find their next home in bodies of lower status on the scale. But no matter where they may find themselves, they are able, nay destined to work their way back<sup>69</sup>. To prove the freedom and equality of all souls in the original *τάξις* a very simple argument suffices. What reason would there have been for assigning in the act of creation higher and lower places to the rational beings, if the creator himself lacked neither the *voluntas* nor the *facultas* for producing a perfect work<sup>70</sup>. We remember what Clement – and Plato – had to say about God's *βούλεσθαι* and *δύνασθαι* as being beyond doubt and admitting no limitations<sup>71</sup>.

While studying Clement's remarkably Platonic views about souls and the places assigned them by divine Providence, we could not help wondering whether he made any attempt to accommodate this scheme to the orthodox Christian beliefs (or, perhaps, vice versa the Christian beliefs to this Platonic scheme). Failing to reach a satisfactory conclusion, we ventured to hold Clement himself responsible for this. If we approach Origen with the same question, the prospects of finding an answer seem brighter. Chapter II 10 in particular discusses the future judgment with its punishment for the sinners “as threatened in the Holy Scriptures and contained in the preaching of the Church” and in this connection also offers explanations of the eternal fire and the purifying fire. Dealing with these topics Origen has for

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his material cannot be dismissed, least of all Justinian's quotations (see now 190, 17ff.; 211, 10ff. 14ff. 19ff. Schwartz); III 5, 4; IV 3, 10f.

<sup>67</sup> See I 6, 1–2, 3; II 1, 2; 107, 29 (*pro salute universarum creaturarum suarum*); II 10, 8; 182, 11ff.; III 5, 4–7 (again with Kötschau's parallels, esp. 278, 21 ff.); 6 pass. Cf. on the doctrine Chadwick in *Cambr. Hist.* (cited n. 59) 191.

<sup>68</sup> See esp. II 9, 6; 169, 25ff. Cf. J. Daniélou, *Histoire des doctrines chrétiennes* 2 (Tournai 1961) 382ff. “Created equal” may go back to Pl. *Tim.* 41 e 3f. H. Langerbeck, *Aufsätze zur Gnosis* (Göttingen 1967) 165f. traces Origen's tenets about free will to Ammonius and Ammonius' own in turn to Alexander of Aphrodisias. He makes no allowance for Clement as precursor of Origen.

<sup>69</sup> See esp. I 6; for defection from the primal One and *ἀποπτώσεις* of varying distance see e.g. II 1, 1.

<sup>70</sup> II 9, 5; 168, 23ff.; cf. I 4, 3. In connection with other subjects Origen admits certain limits of God's power (II 9, 1; c. *Cels.* III 70; V 23). Cf. on this topic Robert M. Grant, *Miracle and Natural Law* (Amsterdam 1952) 127ff. and H. Chadwick, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 41 (1948) 83ff.

<sup>71</sup> See p. 233.

once to concentrate on bodies rather than on souls; still, invoking the apostle's words (1 Cor. 15, 44) he insists that the bodies of those who are to "inherit the kingdom of God" will be transfigured<sup>72</sup>, while to those *inferioris meriti* a body will be given *pro unius cuiusque vitae atque animae dignitate* (II 10, 3; 176, 11 ff.). Thus the principle *pro merito*<sup>73</sup> is upheld; but has not Origen while professing to discuss resurrection actually shifted back to reincarnation? – As for the fire, he refuses to accept it in a literal sense (ib. 10, 4 ff.). Yet despite his insistence – in this and in other points – on a "spiritual" meaning and despite his persistent resort to the methods of non-literal exegesis, in which he is past master, we may question whether he has produced a genuine harmony between the biblical and the Platonic tradition<sup>74</sup>. The notorious falsifications and inadequacies of Rufinus' translation may be partly responsible for this impression. Origen may have come nearer to an integration than the evidence allows us to realize; yet what matters is probably that unlike Clement he made an earnest attempt of fusing the two traditions. A specific concept like the "many mansions" could be easily incorporated into the new system. Very appropriately Origen places all these "mansions" in Heaven; he conceives of them as way-stations in the progress of *gnosis* by which those considered worthy penetrate deeper and deeper into the knowledge God has denied us here on Earth<sup>75</sup>.

Freedom of the individual will is another doctrine in *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* that would repay much closer study than we can here give it. Far from simply accepting this tenet, Origen has taken great pains, most notably in III 1, to establish it securely. In good Hellenic fashion he bases his proof on a theory and classification of the *κινήσεις*, distinguishing between those originating *ἑξωθεν* and others that are either *ἐξ αὐτῶν* or *ἀφ' αὐτῶν*<sup>76</sup>. After this philosophical approach he records whatever support he can find in the Scriptures, quoting numerous passages of the Old as well as of the New Testament<sup>77</sup>. But if we regretfully forego a closer analysis of

<sup>72</sup> I.e. become *πνευματικοί*, as St. Paul says (1 Cor. 15, 44) or *αἰθέριοι* (the evidence is unfortunately not unanimous and even includes *σφαιροειδές*; see II 10, 3 with Kötschau's adnotatio on 176, 20, esp. the 5. *ἀναθεματισμός* imposed by Justinian, see now *Acta Concil. Oecum.* III 213, 25 Schwartz and Justinian's letter to Menas *ibid.* 204, 10f.). For the corpus motif see also I 6, 4; 85, 14ff. Note Chadwick's warning remarks *loc. cit.* 94ff.

<sup>73</sup> According to the text of II 10, 8; 182, 3ff. the *sancti* will receive far better and more beautiful bodies than the sinners. If this is meant to be the final dispensation, universal salvation would not imply equal treatment of all. At 173, 7f. Origen refers to his *libri de resurrectione* for a fuller treatment of the questions (on these *libri* see Cadiou, *Jeunesse* 117f.). Since in other writings Origen hardly ever returns to transmigration and at times even appears to go back on this doctrine (e.g. *c. Cels.* V 29. 49; cf. Cadiou *ibid.* 326ff. and *Introduction* [see above n. 11] 44f.), he may never have achieved a synthesis with the orthodox teachings. Among the remaining uncertainties is whether the *supplicia* of I 6, 3; 84, 6–15 correspond to Clement's *προκρίσεις* (see above p. 243).

<sup>74</sup> At the end of *c. Cels.* III Origen treats "ever-lasting punishment" as a doctrine effective with the simple believers and admits that his own position on the subject of soul is close to pagan philosophers. On resurrection see *ibid.* V 17. <sup>75</sup> II 11, 6; 190, 9ff. 12. 17ff.

<sup>76</sup> III 1, 2ff. Cf. *De orat.* ch. 6, but also Ammonius in Photius (cod. 251) 463 a 28 ff.; 465 b 35 ff.

<sup>77</sup> III 1, 6 ff.; cf. Clem. *Strom.* II 12, 1.

these arguments, what we need for our own purpose is after all Origen's affirmation rather than his demonstration of the doctrine and the affirmation is the more significant because it is embedded in the same context and connected with the same other tenets that surrounded it in Clement and in Laws X.

Now that we have seen how large a debt both Clement and Origen owe to Book X of the Laws, one further question confronts us. In what precise terms are we to define the relation between Stromateis VII and Origen's *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*? The simplest answer would doubtless be to regard the Stromateis as the immediate source of inspiration for the ideas which Origen synthesized into his grand vision. This answer would of course allow for his use of other "sources" as well; for a man as broadly learned as Origen would at any time be able to draw on what was stored in his memory. Yet even so this simple answer is open to serious objections. As scholars have known for some time, Origen never mentions Clement by name, and for no passage in the extensive body of his writings has Clement definitely been identified as the source<sup>78</sup>. Origen may have known Clement personally and may have "studied" with him; but while there are testimonies and arguments favoring these assumptions, the absence of references to Clement weighs heavily in the opposite scale<sup>79</sup>. Still if hitherto a non liquet seemed to be indicated, does not the agreement now brought to light between Stromateis VII and *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* change the situation so as to allow a more positive answer? Or is the basis too small for such far-reaching conclusions?<sup>80</sup> While the agreement does call for serious consideration, it would still seem prudent to give thought also to alternative explanations. Would it be satisfactory to think of the Christian "school" in Alexandria as intellectually predisposed to accept the theological doctrines of Laws X? On this supposition Clement and Origen might independently of one another have found in this Book a conception of Providence so attractive to them that they would respond in a remarkably similar manner. Still another possibility would be that

<sup>78</sup> As Koch op. cit. 315 puts it cautiously, traces of dependence are "nur selten festzustellen".

<sup>79</sup> Inconclusive and partly conflicting as the testimonies (Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* VI 6, 1; 14, 9) are and disquieting as the absence of definite links with Clement in Origen's huge output remains, it is somehow a priori improbable that Origen should have been a complete stranger to Clement and his work. Is it utterly irrelevant that just as Clement composed his *Stromateis* while planning a *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, so Origen produced ten books of *Stromateis* and four *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, both of them before leaving Alexandria (Euseb. VI 24)? Some unknown quantities complicate the problem, one of them being Clement's treatise *Περὶ προνοίας*, of which the few quotations (frgg. 37-43 in vol. III of Stählin's edition) convey no impression.

<sup>80</sup> It might be asked why of the rich "tapestry" which Clement had woven out of the most varied material just one particular piece – and a relatively small at that – should make so deep an impression on Origen's mind. As answer I should refer to what I have said (pp. 238f.) about the prominent place of these thoughts in the work as a whole. As far as the *ἀρχαί* (God Father, the *Λόγος*, the administration of the world, etc.) are concerned, these sections may be regarded as the climax. What follows in Book VII deals primarily with the gnostic, making only incidental contributions to the topic of the *ἀρχαί*. In Book VIII Clement treats altogether different matters; what they are and with what end in view Clement discusses them seems to me still in need of further clarification.

a thinker known to Clement as well as to Origen – but unknown to us – had produced an adaptation of the Platonic doctrines which proved congenial to the intellectuals among the Christians of Alexandria; owing to his influence Clement incorporated these doctrines in his *Stromateis* and Origen made them the foundation of his own great speculative enterprise. The thinker figuring in this hypothesis would be more likely to be a Christian than a pagan, and in this connection a name inevitably suggesting itself is that of Pantaenus, the first “head” of the Alexandrian “school” and as such the “predecessor” of Clement (I use quotation marks because what matters is not so much the institution as the tradition). Unfortunately Pantaenus too is a shadow and in spite of Langerbeck’s praiseworthy efforts<sup>81</sup> there is little hope that he will acquire substance. Still, he was known to Clement as well as to Origen<sup>82</sup>, and it may have been he who discovered Book X of the *Laws* as a rich mine of thoughts and pointed out their affinity to the Christian *παράδοσις*. Thanks to his – or to some other man’s – activity it would be understood that Plato’s teachings on providence should be used as building blocks for a Christian philosophy<sup>83</sup>.

Of the possibilities here offered none is strong enough to rule out the others, yet none either so hopelessly weak that we may dismiss it out of hand. Fortunately all of them have something in common, and the safest course for us is to confine ourselves to the common ground between them, i.e. to recognize the tradition of Christian Platonism in Alexandria as accounting for the agreement between Clement and Origen, leaving open the question at what stage the doctrines of *Laws* X began to be absorbed and in what fashion they, once absorbed, were passed on from one generation to the next. For we surely may reckon with some degree of continuity in the Alexandrian school or, at the lowest, in the community of Christian intellectuals. If at one time too much was made of this continuity and resemblances between the “school” and modern institutions of higher learning were exaggerated, we need not now go to the opposite extreme of discounting the continuity altogether<sup>84</sup>.

<sup>81</sup> Hermann Langerbeck, *JHS* 77 (1957) 71 f.; *Aufsätze zur Gnosis* (Göttingen 1967) 160 ff.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* V 10; VI 6; 14, 8f. (Clem. *Strom.* I 11, 2 may be used with caution and frg. 48 [224, 14f. St.] is unreliable; Phot. *Bibl.* 109; 89 a 38f.: *μαθητῆς δέ, ὡς καὶ αὐτός φησι, Πανταίνου* cannot be dismissed).

<sup>83</sup> W. Bousset, *Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* (Göttingen 1915) 236 ff. attempted to reconstruct large chunks of Pantaenus’ system from an analysis of Clement’s works. Our section (more specifically VII 5–13, 3) is among those he claims for Pantaenus. His reasons lack cogency and his theory is by now out of favor. Cf. the next note.

<sup>84</sup> See for one extreme position on this question Bousset in the book just mentioned (n. 83), for the other J. Munck, *op. cit.* (n. 51) *pass.*, esp. 127 ff., 186 ff.; yet for him too Pantaenus is “der eigentliche Lehrer des Klemens” (185). Gustave Bardy’s paper *Pour l’histoire de l’école d’Alexandrie* (*Vivre et penser* 2 [1942] 80 ff.) has done much to clarify the issue. See also Daniélou, *Origène* 24f.; W. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clem. Alex.* (Berlin/Leipzig 1952) 21 ff.; and for the most recent statement H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought* etc. 33.

Much that Origen brought back from his study with Ammonius Saccas would be welcomed by his fellow Christians of higher intellectual (or in Clement's sense of the word, "gnostic") aspirations, because they were in the process of developing a similar outlook. Yet Ammonius' philosophy would hardly include tenets regarding *σωτηρία*, still less universal *σωτηρία*. Nor, as Theiler has pointed out, did it allow for movements from one level of the hierarchy to another. The conception of the whole to which every part, even the smallest, makes its contribution may have been common to pagan and Christian Platonism – although we cannot say how far beyond the basic idea of a *συμφωνία* the agreement went – and common too, if we accept Theiler's reconstruction, would be freedom of will and the treatment of souls *κατ'ἀξίαν* with reference to previous lives. If Ammonius taught a return of souls after a period of three thousand or ten thousand years<sup>85</sup>, this doctrine would apply only to individual souls; nothing suggests that he approximated Origen's conception of a periodic re-uniting of all spiritual beings with and in God. What Origen obviously did was to fuse the Greek tradition of cosmic periods with the *σωτηρία τοῦ ὅλου* as it would be understood by a Christian, and it is this soteriological motif which gives his cyclical philosophy of history its meaning and unique character<sup>86</sup>.

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<sup>85</sup> See Phot. (cod. 251) 463 a 26 ff., b 24.

<sup>86</sup> If I am correct in taking this view, it is hardly necessary to elaborate it. Christianity had provided a *τέλος* of human history, but of a history which was running its course only once. For almost all later philosophy of history – also the secularized versions – this *τέλος* was to prove of the greatest importance. However Origen somehow stultified the idea by introducing into it the *κύκλοι* of Greek cosmological and political thought (the cosmic version being doubtless more important for him). Thus it is not difficult to understand that orthodox Christianity rejected his version, while it later was ready to endorse that of St. Augustine. – I wish to thank Professor Samuel Kinser for reading this paper and giving me his criticism.